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Abstract
Card-based partnerships between banks and retailers
have created new opportunities for profit enhancement. We
use public data, together with proprietary data from a financial institution to examine the impact of card-based
promotions on consumer behavior and merchant performance. The results show that card promotions are associated with increasing customer traffic and transactions from
the bank for its merchant partners. We also found significant variation among offer sizes, types, as well as merchant
and consumer segments. Our research creates valuable
insights and paves the way forward for decision support.

1. Introduction
Card products are getting ever more sophisticated
and have a mix of hard and soft benefits, including
rewards and cash rebates from co-branded loyalty
programs, and long-term promotions with retail merchants. Well-designed card programs enable banks to
grow targeted customer bases, achieve more merchant purchases and revenues, improve customer
benefits and brand awareness [2], and result in a winwin-win outcome [12].
Banks also face fierce competition. Some issuers
have learned through failures that an inefficient program may not succeed even after its costs have been
reduced [5]. Hence, banks must figure out whether
the bundled benefits with a credit card can drive increasing revenue from the merchant partner based on
leveraging consumer preferences in a way that creates customer centricity.
Research on card programs in financial services,
and loyalty programs, coupons and price promotions
in other industries has grown, showcasing perspectives of academic strategists and data analytics specialists. Our work contributes by combining anonymized customer transaction data with public data to
investigate the impact of card-based promotions on
consumer behavior and merchant performance.
We answer these questions: (1) What are the effects of card-based promotions on merchant sales and
consumer purchases through credit cards? (2) Do
these promotions drive more customer traffic and
transactions with merchant partners from bank cus-
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tomers? (3) How do the effects vary for promotion
size and type, across merchant and customer segments?
We focus on the market of an Asian country and
study a popular and transparent business sector,
which enabled us to collect merchant data from an
online aggregator. We acquired other data, such as
credit card offers from the websites of various banks,
and anonymized data on transactions and customers
from a financial institution. By consolidating the data
with a fuzzy matching algorithm, we were able to
construct a panel dataset for model estimation.
Our results show positive impacts of card promotions on customer traffic and transaction volume.
However, the influence on merchant sales is unclear.
We also found varied effects of card promotions
among offer sizes and types, as well as for different
merchant and customer segments. Our work offers
new knowledge about credit card programs and paves
the way forward for decision support in banks to
more deeply probe credit card customer rewards and
loyalty program behavior.

2. Related Literature
We will discuss prior studies on credit card rewards, loyalty programs, and price promotions in
Finance, Marketing and Information Systems (IS).

2.1. Card Rewards in Financial Services
Research related to credit card rewards has investigated a variety of issues, including biased consumer
preferences, redemption behavior, and customer loyalty [7, 9, 11, 13]. Studies relevant to this research
have looked into the impacts of card programs on
consumer buying behavior.
Wirtz et al. [21] examined the impact of card loyalty programs on wallet share and suggested that attractive reward programs are likely to increase credit
card usage. Ching and Hayashi [6] found through
unique empirical research that consumers were willing to switch to cash and checks for in-store payments if card rewards were removed. However, few
past works have systematically quantified the effects
of such programs.
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2.2. Loyalty Programs in Other Industries

3. Data Description and Research Context

Loyalty program studies have been conducted in
other contexts such as airlines, hotels, and supermarkets. It is widely accepted in Marketing literature that
loyalty programs are profitable for firms [1, 7, 15].
An example is Kopalle et al. [10], who used data
from a major hotel chain and found that the reward
frequency and customer-tier components of a loyalty
program contribute to incremental sales. In the same
context, Wang et al. [20] launched a large-scale field
experiment and identified increased consumer buying
behavior due to loyalty promotions.
Some research suggests otherwise: that loyalty
programs are not always producing. Gupta and Lehmann [8] demonstrated that a number of companies
invest large amounts of money in loyalty management but receive few tangible profits. Villenueva et
al. [19] argued that increased price competition may
cause lower profits when firms focus on long-term
profit maximization in loyalty programs.

Our research site involves the credit card market
in an Asian country, with a focus on one of the most
active and vibrant competitive sectors in the country.
We next explain how we built a dataset for empirical
analysis by consolidating data from multiple sources
and applying machine-based data analytics prior to
our implementation of explanatory econometrics.

3.1. Credit Card Offers from Banks
By collecting credit card offers from webpages of
4 leading banks (I, II, III and IV), we acquired observations from September to December 2015, including
the merchant partner names and offer descriptions.
Summary statistics for card offers are in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Credit card offers of the 4 banks

2.3. Price Discounts and Promotion Types
There are numerous empirical studies on coupons,
price discounts, and other promotion types, that have
explored the market responses and dynamics of different promotion sizes and types, and optimal competing strategies for retailers. Neslin [14] estimated a
market response model using retailer scanner data
and revealed the effects of couponing on market
shares. Subramanian and Rao [18] developed a theoretical model, which shows that displaying sales on
websites can transform the cannibalization of merchant revenues into an advantage and improve customer acquisition. In contrast, Simonson et al. [17]
and Anderson [3] both suggested that sales promotions sometimes serve as adverse signals of product
quality, resulting in negative impacts on consumerbuying decisions.
Loyalty programs in financial services, especially
credit card programs, differ from those in other industries though. First, typical loyalty programs in
retailing are created for a single company, but card
promotions often involve multiple stakeholders in the
same market. Second, unlike firms in the hospitality,
air travel and retailing areas, banks usually have larger and more long-lived customer bases that exhibit
higher variation in their preferences. Third, credit
card programs offer several types of promotions, including rewards, cash rebates, and price discounts
simultaneously. So the research gap in promotionrelated research between financial services and other
industries encourages our exploratory work supported
by unique data.

The banks enrolled many merchant partners each:
I (70), II (72), III (122) and IV (144). They arranged
many deals for the various outlets of the merchants,
leading to numerous card-based offers: I (163), II
(400), III (189), and IV (407). Most merchants gave a
10% discount, while others offered 15% to 20%.
Other deals included: one-paid-one-free, special instant rebates, and complementary goods.

3.2. Merchants in the Local Market
We collected merchant data from a popular online
aggregator with a special focus on the business sector
that we investigated. It covers 100,000+ merchants,
from which we obtained review data on 9,811 of the
most popular ones. Useful attributes include merchant name, zipcode location, perceived quality
score, number of votes, price levels, service type, and
other information about the merchants’ operations.
Fig. 2. Distribution of merchant quality levels
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As shown in Fig. 2, the average review scores,
votes and prices were 69.58, 11.73 and $23.44. The
scores tended to be anchored, and the votes and prices had a right-skewed distribution.
To measure consumer purchasing behavior, we
acquire anonymized transaction and customer data
from a financial institution. Typical transaction information and descriptors were related to customer
standing with the bank. Demographic data were also
leveraged.

4.1. Merchant-Level Model
The merchant-level (j) model is:
ln(Salesjt) = β0 + β1 PartnerBkjt + β2 PartnerCompjt
+ β3 PartnerBkjt × PartnerCompjt
+ β4 ln(Scorej) + β5 ln(Votesj) + β6 ln(Pricej)
+ β7 Storesj + β8 MerchTenurejt + α Servicej
+ γ Mechj + σ Zipj + δ Timet + εjt

We used a fuzzy matching algorithm based on
merchant name, address, phone number and zipcode
to connect the multiple datasets. This way, we created a unique dataset, which supports data analytics for
deeper insights on the business strategies for banks in
card partnerships. Table 1 suggests that banks generally partnered with popular merchants that created
customer satisfaction. Bank I preferred the pricier
merchants to attract affluent customers, while the
other banks targeted lower-priced merchants.

Here, ln(Salesjt), is the natural log of the sales of
merchant j at month t. We also used the number of
customers (Custjt) and transactions (Transjt) as alternate measures. Market percentages (%Salesjt, %Custjt, %Transjt) are used for robustness checks.
PartnerBkjt is binary, to indicate if merchant j had
a card partnership with the bank at month t. To control for competing effects, merchant partnerships with
rival banks (PartnerCompjt) were included, along
with an interaction term to examine competitor credit
card offer effectiveness. We used variables with merchant information, and controlled for 3-digit zip
code-level variation in merchant locations (Zipj) and
time trends (Timet) too. εjt is an error term.

Table 1. Merchant partner averages for 4 banks

4.2. Customer-Level Model

3.3 Fuzzy Matching to Build the Dataset

BANK I
Med. Mean
Score 72.0 69.8
Votes 15.0 26.2
Price 50.0 61.6

BANK II
Med. Mean
60.5 54.0
11.0 17.3
23.5 28.0

BANK III
Med. Mean
67.0 63.24
14.0 27.9
30.0 36.5

BANK IV
Med. Mean
72.5 69.4
13.5 24.2
31.0 39.3

Finally, the dataset we used for econometric analysis came to consist of 4,500+ merchants and
400,000+ customers from September to December
2015. See Table 2.
Table 2. Summary statistics
VARIABLES
Sales
Cust
Trans
MerchTenure
Score
Votes
Price
Store
Age
Income
Children
CustTenure

# OBS
MEAN
SE
MIN
MAX
15,860
12 ,852 41,304.52 0
1,296,929
15,860
149.74
880.87
0
34,244
15,860
189.93
1,466.07
0
58,636
15,860
17.34
8.93
0
27.30
7,677
48.24
14.90
0
70
7,677
14.90
18.12
0.7
194
7,152
25.05
24.79
1.4
366.80
8,946
1.85
4.83
0.7
90.30
5,068,316
28.38
7.57
12.6
62.30
5,068,316 143,267.94 2,331,664 84.0 62,222,219
5,068,316
0.01
0.15
0
2.80
5,068,316
85.20
59.50
0
496.30

Notes. Merchant (Sales, Cust, Trans, MerchTenure) and customer data
(Age, Income, Children, CustTenure) disguised with a multiplier, to
protect the financial institution’s identity.

4. Model and Methodology
Our access to merchant and customer data allowed estimation of two baseline models, which we
will discuss next.

We further developed a customer-level model that
controls for individual differences, and examines the
probability of a consumer i purchasing from a specific merchant using logistic regression:
Pr(Purchaseijt) = β0 + β1 PartnerBkjt + β2 PartnerCompjt
+ β3 PartnerBkjt × PartnerCompjt
+ β4 ln(Scorej) + β5 ln(Votesj) + β6 ln(Pricej)
+ β7 Storesj + β8 CustTenurejt + α Servicej
+ γ Mechj + σ Zipj + ϕ Xit + δ Timet + µijt

Purchaseijt is binary to indicate whether customer
i purchased from merchant j in month t. The number
of transactions (Transijt) is used to check robustness.
Besides merchant-level controls, we included Xit, a
set of individual variables regarding demographics
and banking status. We controlled for customer age
(Ageit), gender (Genderi), income (Incomei), marital
status (Marriagei), education level (Educi), nationality (Nationalityi), and number of children (#Childreni). We also included how long the customer was
with the bank (CustTenurei), types of credit cards
held (CardTypei), and whether the customer had past
purchase experience with the merchant (Experiencei)
to control for his standing with the bank.

4.3. Regression Methods
We applied negative binomial regression, Poisson
regression, quantile regression, beta regression and
logistic regression to deal with the different response
variables in the two baseline models.
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5. Main Findings of the Research

adjusting for endogenity though.

We next present the estimation results of the merchant-level and customer-level models.

Table 4. Results of merchant matching

5.1. A Matched Merchant Sample
We first used the full merchant dataset for model
estimation, and the results showed significant and
positive market responses to card promotions. 1 , 2
There was endogeneity with merchant selection by
the bank though. It had a strong preference to partner
with merchants that had higher sales, higher price
levels and more stores, as noted in our descriptive
analysis in Table 4. This may have led to overestimated coefficients in the models.
To address this issue, we matched the merchant
partners with non-partners. 3 Table 4 shows that the
gaps for the different variables narrowed after matching. Among the ratios we tried, 1:1 matching gave the
best results with the closest numbers for the attributes
between the partner and non-partner group. Thus, we
re-estimated our baseline merchant level model using
the 1-to-1 matched merchant sample. See Table 5.
Consistent with the full merchant dataset findings,
card promotions attracted 28.02% more consumers
and increased transaction volume by 25.99%.4 There
was no significant impact on merchant sales after

VARIABLES
Sales
Score
Votes
Price
Stores
MerchTenure
Obs.

We imputed values for missing data with averages for
numeric variables and a “missing” indicator for categorical
variables. We also used one sample without imputed values
for missing data; and another where only missing values
due to “No Review” from the aggregator was imputed.
2
The coefficients for the output variables are βPartnerBk =
0.592 for ln(Sales), βPartnerBk = 1.018 for Cust, and βPartnerBk
= 1.001 for Trans; all with p < 0.01. The coefficients of
PartnerComp were also positive (βComp = 0.217, p < 0.05
for ln(Sales); βComp = 0.182, p < 0.01 for Cust; βComp =
0.204, p < 0.01 for Trans), suggesting positive impact of
card promotions from competitors. But, negative coefficients for the interaction term (βPartner x Comp = -0.553, p <
0.10 for ln(Sales); βPartner x Comp = -0.416, p < 0.05 for Cust;
βPartner x Comp = -0.345, p < 0.1 for Trans) mean that parallel
promotions from competitors partially offset the effect on
merchant performance with customers from the bank.
3
We used propensity score matching based on average
monthly values of: prior year sales, evaluated score, votes,
price level, number of stores, and tenure with customers of
the bank, together with service type, operating mechanism
and location. The logit model is specified as Pr(PartnerBkj
= 1) = f(ln(Salesj), ln(Scorej), ln(Votesj), ln(Pricej), MerchTenurej, Servicej, Mechj, Zipj).
4
The negative binomial models the log of the expected
count as a function of the independent variables. The estimated coefficients are interpreted as changes in log expected counts with a unit change in a variable. The
change% = (ecoef – 1) × 100% = (e0.247 – 1) × 100% =
28.02%.

70,371
(-167,008)
61.73
(20.71)
23.52
(22.62)
50.61
(72.38)
10.50
(23.06)
21.25
(5.06)
64

NONPARTNERS
16,979
(-41,476)
69.19
(22.47)
21.25
(26.09)
34.95
(32.92)
2.37
(5.52)
18.04
(8.06)
2,212

MATCHED
NONPARTNERS
69,465
(-155,816)
61.68
(21.00)
29.66
(32.28)
50.93
(55.41)
9.59
(20.63)
21.04
(5.45)
64

Notes. Std err. in parens. 1:1 matching ratio applied. 1:2, 1:5, and
1:10 matches used for comparisons. Merchant (Sales, MerchTenure)
disguised with a multiplier, to protect the identity of the financial
institution from being disclosed.

Table 5. Baseline merchant-level model results
with matched merchant sample
Intercept
PartnerBk
PartnerComp

1

PARTNERS

PartnerBk ×
PartnerComp

ln(Sales)
-6.653***
(1.719)
-0.003
(0.187)
0.462
(0.325)
-0.607
(0.387)

Cust
-5.799***
(1.139)
0.247**
(0.119)
0.077
(0.194)
-0.200
(0.235)

Trans
-5.828***
(1.159)
0.231*
(0.122)
0.059
(0.198)
-0.173
(0.239)

Notes. 508 obs.; std. err. in parens. OLS used for ln(Sales), neg. bin.
used for Cust and Trans. Poisson model estimated for robustness.
Control var. estimates suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10; ** = p <
0.05; *** = p < 0.01.

Why? Possibly due to cannibalization of merchant
revenues from existing customers, when there are
extra price discounts. Thus, the overall impact on
sales depended on the tradeoff between the increase
in quantities and the reduction in prices. Also, loyalty
programs that discriminate against non-loyal customers may lead to their dissatisfaction, and hence
switching to competitors [16].

5.3. Baseline Customer-level Model Results
The results of the customer-level and merchantlevel model were consistent. As Table 6 shows, card
promotions resulted in a 62.8% increase in the bank’s
customers’ likelihood to purchase. It also increased
customer monthly transactions. Similar results regarding parallel promotions from competing banks
were acquired for the customer-level model, suggesting card promotions from competing banks offset the
overall promotion effects of offers by the bank.
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Table 6. Baseline customer-level model results
Intercept
PartnerBk
PartnerComp
PartnerBk ×
PartnerComp

Purchase
-15.906
(16.314)
0.628***
(0.032)
0.105***
(0.027)
-0.266***
(0.038)

Trans
-25.771***
(1.191)
0.638***
(0.030)
0.075***
(0.028)
-0.211***
(0.038)

offers from competitors was lower above the 70th
quantile, while it was largest between the 20th and
65th quantiles.
Fig. 5. Quantile regression results
PartnerBk

PartnerBk × PartnerComp

Notes. 5,068,316 obs.; std. errs. in parens. Logit used for Purchase; neg. bin. used for Trans. Poisson model estimated for robustness. Control var. estimates suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10;
** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.

5.4. Promotion Size Decomposition

5.6. Merchant and Customer Segmentation

To examine the effects of different sizes and types
of promotions, we decomposed the partnership indicator into specific offers, for discounts, cash rebates,
rewards and other promotion types (one-paid-onefree, complementary goods, and report in Table 7.

We conducted segment subsampling based on the
medians of Score, Votes, Price, MechTenure and
Stores, and estimated the merchant-level model using
the subsamples. In Fig. 6, popular and pricier merchants showed higher profitability and customer attraction capability. The coefficients of Score,
MechTenure and Store were negative, though lower
scores, higher tenure and stores were better off.

Table 7. Decomposition results for promotion size

Intercept
PartnerBk:
10% Disc
PartnerBk:
15% Disc
PartnerBk:
20% Disc
PartnerBk:
Rebate
PartnerBk:
Reward
PartnerBk:
Other

MERCHANT-LEVEL
CUSTOMER-LEVEL
ln(Sales)
Cust
Trans Purchase Trans
-7.203*** -1.365
-16.333 -10.630*** -2.110*
(1.831) (1.160) (16.243) (1.050)
(1.187)
-0.696*** -0.193 -0.439*** -0.313*** -0.154
(0.265) (1.152) (0.106)
(0.055)
(0.156)
0.455 0.857*** 0.214*
0.144*
0.740**
(0.437) (0.291) (0.112)
(0.079)
(0.301)
-0.112
0.176 0.565*** 0.664***
0.074
(0.610) (0.348) (0.102)
(0.055)
(0.358)
0.409 1.267*** 1.699*** 1.932*** 1.303***
(0.385) (0.250) (0.101)
(0.046)
(0.258)
0.128
0.102
-0.132
-0.054
0.046
(0.362) (0.220) (0.100)
(0.048)
(0.225)
0.648
0.426 0.948*** 1.005***
0.393
(0.499) (0.363) (0.127)
(0.094)
(0.385)

Notes. 508 obs. for merchant model and 5,068,316 obs. for customer
model; Disc = merchandise discount. Std. errs. in parens. OLS used
for ln(Sales); neg. bin. used for Cust and Trans; logit used for Purchase. Poisson model estimated for robustness. Control estimates
suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.

In price promotions, a 15% discount had the
strongest impact on merchant sales, customer traffic
and transactions (βPartnerBk = 0.937, p < 0.05 for
ln(Sales); βPartnerBk = 1.067, p < 0.01 for Cust; βPartnerBk = 1.037, p < 0.01 for Trans). Lower or higher
discounts showed weak or inverse effects. There was
more market response to other promotion types, especially cash rebates than price discounts.

5.5. Sales Stratification
We stratified ln(Sales) in the merchant-level
model using quantile regression. As shown in Fig. 5,
the effects of card promotions were negative in the
lower quantiles and became positive between the
60th to 90th quantiles. The offset effect of parallel

Fig. 6. Merchant and customer segment results

We looked into customer segments based on their
average monthly spend in the targeted business sector, in all sectors, as well as the percentage, and show
the between-groups results in Fig. 7. The results consistently show that heavy spenders were less likely to
react to credit card promotions, while the offers were
more attractive to light spenders, probably due to
different price sensitivities across customer groups.

5.7. Robustness Checks
We turned to shares of Sales, Cust, and Trans and
used beta regression for robustness checks. The results in Table 8 are consistent with our earlier analysis, providing additional support for our conclusions.
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Table 8. Robustness estimation results
RELATIVE MARKET SHARES
%Sales
%Cust
%Trans
-7.857***
-7.043***
-7.109***
Intercept
(0.269)
(0.292)
(0.297)
0.078
0.208***
0.223***
PartnerBk
(0.051)
(0.059)
(0.059)
0.176**
0.157*
0.103
PartnerComp
(0.071)
(0.080)
(0.086)
-0.167*
-0.146
-0.093
PartnerBk ×
PartnerComp
(0.088)
(0.098)
(0.102)
Notes. 508 obs. Std. errs. in parens. Beta regression used for
%Sales, %Cust and %Trans; neg. bin. used for Trans; and logit
used for Purchase. Poisson model estimated for robustness.
Control var. estimates suppressed to save space. Signif. * = p <
0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.

6. Conclusion
The proliferation of credit card products and cardbased programs has created opportunities for banks
enhance profitability. This research investigated how
consumer behavior and merchant performance may
be affected by card-based programs. We contributed
new knowledge for card marketing between banks
and retailers. We also offered useful policy analytics
ideas, and supports reconsideration of business policy
in the card promotions domain. In addition, we delivered results that pave the way for decision support in
banks to more deeply probe credit card customer rewards and loyalty program behavior.
We leveraged machine-based big data techniques
to acquire data from public domain and combine it
with the proprietary data of a financial institution. In
spite of this, we recognize several limitations. First,
the merchant data we obtained from the online aggregator was from a single time point. We were unable to capture the changing quality attributes of the
merchants in our model. Second, the card promotions
drawn from bank websites tend to cover longer-term
partnerships with retailers. Ad hoc offers, which were
not displayed on the webpages, were not included.
Third, techniques such as screen-scraping and database harvesting did not allow us to obtain historical
data. Thus, we were unable to conduct “within” comparisons for estimates of higher fidelity. Last, the
business sector we focused on is just one among
many others in which consumers use credit cards to
purchase and acquire benefits. Such efforts offer new
and useful insights on customer behavior for firms
and organizations in many other sectors.
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